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Abstract. We propose a new protocol for the generalized consensus
problem in asynchronous systems subject to Byzantine server failures.
The protocol solves the consensus problem in a setting in which infor-
mation about conflict between transactions is available (such information
can be in the form of transaction read and write sets). Unlike most prior
proposals (for generalized or classical consensus), which use a leader to
order transactions, this protocol is leaderless, and relies on non-skipping
timestamps for transaction ordering. Being leaderless, the protocol does
not need to pause for leader elections. The use of non-skipping times-
tamps permits servers to commit transactions as soon as they know that
no conflicting transaction can be ordered earlier. For n servers of which
f may be faulty, this protocol requires n > 4f .
1 Introduction
A distributed ledger is a distributed data structure, replicated across multiple
nodes, where transactions from clients are published in an agreed-upon total
order. Today, Bitcoin [25] is perhaps the best-known distributed ledger protocol.
There are two kinds of distributed ledgers. In permissionless ledgers, such as
Bitcoin, any node can participate in the common protocol by proposing trans-
actions, and helping to order them. In permissioned ledgers, by contrast, a node
must be authorized before it can participate. Permissionless ledgers make sense
for cryptocurrencies which seek to ensure that nobody can control who can
participate. Permissioned ledgers make sense for structured marketplaces, such
as financial exchanges, where parties do not necessarily trust one another, but
where openness and anonymity are not goals. State machine replication [32] is
the most common way to implement permissioned ledgers.
In state machine replication, the servers agree on a total order for all trans-
actions, and every server executes the transactions in the same order. If two
successive transactions commute, the two transactions can be executed in dif-
ferent orders by different servers. To determine if two transactions commute,
we can check if the state variables accessed for reading or writing (read and
write sets) by one transaction are written to by the other transactions and vice-
versa. Existing state machine replication protocols are limited in their ability
to exploit transaction commutativity. Protocols that exploit general transaction
commutativity solve what is called the generalized consensus problem in which
a dependency structure is assumed on the transactions [28,18]. Published work
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on generalized consensus, [18,28,29,33]with few exceptions, is limited to systems
with servers subject to crash failures. Pires et al. [30] propose a leader-based
generalized state machine replication algorithm, and Abd-El-Malek et al. [1]
propose a client-driven quorum-based protocol called Q/U that is very efficient
under low contention, but that requires n > 5f , and can suffer from livelock in
the presence of contention even in synchronous periods.
The contribution of this paper is a novel permissioned ledger algorithm, which
we call Byblos. Byblos has three properties of interest.
– Generality. Byblos exploits semantic knowledge about client requests to re-
duce transaction latency. Client transactions include statically-declared read
and write sets. The technical key to effectively exploiting semantic knowl-
edge is a novel use of non-skipping timestamp [5] to bound the set of in-flight
transactions that might end up ordered before a particular transaction. If
an otherwise-complete transaction does not conflict with any of its potential
predecessors, that transaction can be committed without further delay. For
system loads with few conflicts between transactions, solutions for gener-
alized consensus can be much more efficient than solutions for traditional
consensus [18].
– Leaderless. Byblos is leaderless. With some exceptions [1,9,21], prior repli-
cated state machine algorithms use a leader to order client requests. Leader-
based algorithms typically have two kinds of phases: a relatively simple nor-
mal phase where the leaders send and receive messages to the others, and
a complicated “view change” phase [11,16,20,34] used to detect and replace
faulty leaders. Leader election comes at a cost: client requests are typically
blocked during leader election even in periods of synchrony. Such delays
are especially problematic if valuable periods of synchrony are spent elect-
ing leaders instead of making progress. (Other leaderless protocols, such as
EPaxos [23], make similar observations.)
In Byblos, transactions are guaranteed to terminate in periods of synchrony.
Technically, Byblos does not need a leader because it is centered around a
leaderless non-skipping timestamp algorithm.
– Simple. Byblos is simple to explain and understand. While simplicity is
subjective, readers who are familiar with other protocols for Byzantine fault
tolerance will note that the full protocol is described in this paper.
In Byblos, transactions are ordered by timestamp, with ties resolved through
some canonical ordering such comparing transaction identifier hashes. For a given
timestamp value t, Byblos can determine an upper bound on the set of in-flight
pending transactions that might have timestamp t assigned to them. We say this
ability to bound the set of potentially conflicting pending transactions makes
Byblos clairvoyant. If a transaction T with timestamp t is the next one to be ex-
ecuted by a replica among those transactions with timestamp t, and T does not
conflict with any of the pending transactions, then T can be executed without
waiting for the status of the pending transactions to be resolved. Byblos guaran-
tees progress by calling on an “off-the-shelf” asynchronous Byzantine agreement
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algorithm, preferably early deciding [7,35], to CANCEL or COMMIT pending
transactions 3.
Byblos tolerates f < n/4 faulty servers, assuming the underlying consensus
algorithm does the same. If there are no conflicts between pending transactions
and transactions waiting for execution, Byblos can make progress even in periods
of complete asynchrony. (This claim does not contradict the FLP impossibility
result [15].)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work.
Section 3 introduces the problem and the system model. Section 4 gives a detailed
description of Byblos assuming clients fail by crashing and Section 5 proves
its correctness and Section 6 describes how Byzantine clients can be tolerated.
Section 7 discusses the performance of Byblos under various assumptions on
failures and synchrony and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Leader-based distributed ledgers such as Paxos [17] and Raft [27] do not exploit
knowledge of read-write sets to reduce latency and increase throughput. Dis-
tributed ledgers that do exploit such information include Generalized Paxos [18],
Egalitarian Paxos [23], Hyperledger Fabric [10], NEO [26], and Bitcoin itself [25].
There is a large body of literature on state machine replication, most of which
is leader-based. Clement et al. [12] observe that many Byzantine fault-tolerant
(BFT) protocols can perform poorly in the presence of Byzantine failures. They
define the notion of a fragile optimization, where a single misbehaving party can
knock the system off an optimized path. They also define gracious (synchronous,
non-faulty) and uncivil (synchronous, limited Byzantine faults) executions. They
argue that while most BFT protocols are optimized only for gracious execu-
tions, it is also important that protocols perform well in uncivil executions.
They propose Aardvark, a BFT protocol designed to perform well under uncivil
executions. Aardvark uses a leader, with regularly-scheduled view changes. The
protocol includes safeguards against censorship by the leader. Amir et al. [2] in-
troduce bounded delay as a performance goal for BFT protocols. Bounded delay
captures the inability of Byzantine servers or clients to impose arbitrary delays
on transaction processing. They introduced Prime, a BFT protocol that uses
a leader that is monitored by other servers to provide bounded delay in the
presence of limited Byzantine failures.
Paxos [17] and Raft [27] are perhaps the best-known non-Byzantine repli-
cation protocols. Other Paxos-related non-Byzantine protocols include Men-
cius [19] and EPaxos [23]. These protocols, with the exception of EPaxos [23], use
some form of leader (or leaders) and view changes. Milosevic et al. [22] proposed
a BFT-Mencius which also uses performance monitoring and view changes to
limit the effects of slow servers. Byblos does not use view changes or performance
monitoring and hence allows unbounded variance below the timeout threshold.
3 Asynchronous consensus algorithms are those that guarantee safety at all times, and
progress under eventual synchrony
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Prior protocols that perform relatively well under uncivil executions perform
less well in civil executions, compared to protocols optimized only for civil execu-
tions. Byblos is different. Its latency, measured in the number of message round
trips, is comparable to protocols optimized for civil execution. In the absence
of slow or faulty clients, its latency in uncivil executions is also comparable to
that of protocols optimized for civil executions. On the downside, Byblos uses
signatures, whereas some protocols use faster message authentication codes.
One BFT protocol that does not use leaders or view changes is HoneyBad-
gerBFT [21]. Unlike most BFT protocols, HoneyBadgerBFT does not assume
eventual (or partial) synchrony, but relies on a randomized atomic broadcast
protocol with a cryptographic shared coin. HoneyBadgerBFT ensures censor-
ship resistance through a cryptographic subprotocol. Unlike Byblos, HoneyBad-
gerBFT does not exploit transaction semantics. The RBFT BFT protocol [4]
uses multiple leaders, who track one another, and provide censorship resistance.
It is designed for systems in which clients can have multiple parallel pending
requests. Aublin et. al [3] describe a family of protocols, some of which have low
(2-message) latency in synchronous executions.
As noted, the protocols discussed, with the exception of EPaxos [23] which
only tolerates crash failures, do not solve the generalized consensus problem [18,28].
Abd-El-Malek et al. [1] propose a client-driven quorum-based protocol called
Q/U that is very efficient under low contention, but that requires n > 5f and
can suffer from livelock due to contention even in synchronous periods. The al-
gorithm is leaderless and uses exponential backoff in the presence of contention.
Cowling et al. [13] aims at improving Q/U by reverting to using a leader. Re-
cently Pires et al. [30] proposed a leader-based Byzantine version of generalized
Paxos.
In general, faulty clients in Byblos can force servers to revert to an “off-the-
shelf” binary Byzantine consensus protocol to resolve the outcome of “stuck”
transactions. Triggering the agreement protocol might incur a timeout which can
be significantly larger than typical communication delay even for fast protocols
(for example, Ben-Or et al. [8] or Mostefaoui et al. [24]). It might seem that
Byblos replaces one source of delay (a faulty leader) with another (faulty clients),
but this replacement allows us to exploit transaction semantics which can be a
significant improvement in some settings. In systems in which faulty servers can
delay the processing of transactions (which is almost all systems), everyone is
delayed. (These issues are discussed in Section 7.)
3 Problem and System Model
A ledger (Figure 1) can be thought of as an automaton consisting of a set of states
(for example, clients’ account balances), a set of deterministic state transitions
called transactions ( for example, deposits, withdrawals, and transfers), and a log
recording the sequence of transactions. The state is needed to efficiently compute
transactions’ return values (for example, overdrawn account). The log provides
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1 state = initialState
2 log = []
3 while true:
4 on receive T from c:
5 log .append(T)
6 state , result = apply(T, state)
7 send result to c
Fig. 1. Ledger Abstraction
an audit trail: one can reconstruct any prior state of the ledger, and trace who
was responsible for each transaction.
Our solution encompasses the following components. There are n servers
that maintain the ledger’s long-lived state via a set of replicated logs. Up to f of
n = 4f + 1 servers may be Byzantine (not behaving according to the protocol).
The rest of the servers are correct. The logs of correct servers are only modified
by appending new transactions. The servers satisfy the following safety property:
for any pair of correct servers, one server’s log is a prefix of the other’s. It follows
that correct servers execute all transactions in the same order.
There is a potentially unbounded number of clients who originate transac-
tions. It is the servers’ job to accept transactions from clients, order them, and
publish this order. We assume that the clients are not Byzantine; in Section 6
we explain how to handle Byzantine clients.
Communication is handled by an underlying message-diffusion system. Clients
broadcast messages, which are eventually delivered to all correct servers. Servers
communicate with one another through the same diffusion infrastructure. We as-
sume that messages are delivered in the order they are sent which can be easily
implemented in practice using message counters. We assume that the identity of
the sender is included in the message and that messages cannot be forged; a client
or server cannot send a message to another server or client that has a different
sender than the actual sender. In practice, this is enforced using signatures.
The ledger state is a key-value store. Each client transaction declares a read
set, the set of keys it might possibly read, and a write set, the set of keys it
might possibly write. Any transaction that violates its declaration is rejected.
(Systems such as Generalized Paxos [18], Egalitarian Paxos [23], and NEO [26]
all make use of similar conflict declarations.)
4 Byblos Description
In Byblos, transactions are assigned integer timestamps, which partially deter-
mine the order in which transactions are applied. If two transactions do not over-
lap in time, the later one will be assigned a larger timestamp, but overlapping
transactions may be assigned the same timestamp. One can think of assigning a
timestamp as assigning a slot to a transaction. Non-overlapping transactions will
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be in different slots, but overlapping transactions might be in the same slot. The
protocol we use for assigning timestamps guarantees that a new slot will not be
assigned to a transaction before every previous slot has at least one transaction
in it. This is guaranteed by non-skipping property of the assigned timestamps [5]:
if a timestamp t is assigned to a transaction, then every timestamp whose value
is less than t must have been previously assigned to some other transaction.
The non-skipping timestamp protocol [5] at the heart of the algorithm is
simple. A client broadcasts a timestamp request to the servers, and collects
at least n − f timestamps in response. The client selects the (f + 1)st latest
timestamp, which is guaranteed to be less than or equal to the latest timestamp
assigned to any transaction. The client increments that timestamp by one, and
later broadcasts it to the servers. It has been shown [5] that this way of choosing
timestamps ensures that no timestamp value is skipped.
The properties of non-skipping timestamps suggest a simple way for servers
to execute transactions in a deterministic order in the absence of client failures.
Starting with timestamp 1, execute all transactions with timestamp 1 in some
deterministic order, then execute all transaction with timestamp 2 in some de-
terministic order, and so on. In general, once all transactions with timestamp t
are executed, transactions with timestamp t+1 can be executed. This technique
is, of course, too simple, even in the absence of client failures. The catch is that
servers cannot determine when all transactions with a given timestamp value
have been received.
To determine when all transactions with timestamp t have been received, By-
blos calculates for each timestamp t, a set of pending[t] of transactions that were
detected to be concurrent with, or occurring before transactions with times-
tamp t. The set of pending transactions contains transactions, but not their
assigned timestamps, because those timestamps might not be known at the time
a transaction is added to a pending set. The crucial property is the following:
pending[t] is guaranteed to contain all transactions whose assigned timestamp
will be t or less. However, it may also include some transactions that will be
assigned timestamps larger than t. For a given transaction T with timestamp
t, if the timestamps of the transactions in pending[t] are known, then, by the
property of the pending set, the set of all transaction that could be assigned
timestamp t is also known. In the absence of client failures, servers can execute
transactions as follows: transactions with timestamp t can be executed when
the timestamps of all transactions in the pending set become known and all
transactions ordered earlier have been executed.
Servers can do better by taking into consideration potential conflicts between
transactions. Given a deterministic ordering on transactions, with transactions
with smaller timestamps appearing before transactions with larger timestamps in
the order, a transaction T with timestamp t can be executed when all conflicting
transactions that appear before T in the order are executed and there are no
conflicting transactions in the pending set that could be ordered before T (this
requires that the timestamps of those conflicting transactions be known).
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1 received = ∅ // messages from servers
2 ∀ s in Servers timestamp[s] = 0
3
4 // get valid timestamp
5 broadcast Propose(T) to Servers
6 repeat
7 on receive m: received = received ∪ {m}
8 until ProposeAck(T, t) received from ≥ n− f servers
9 ∀ s in Servers : if ∃ t : ProposeAck(T, t) received from s
10 timestamp[s] = t
11 tˆ = ((f + 1)st largest value in timestamp[∗]) + 1
12
13 // broadcast timestamp, and wait for transaction result
14 broadcast Confirm(T,tˆ) to Servers
15 repeat
16 on receive m: received = received ∪ {m}
17 until ≥ f + 1 identical Resolve(T, code, result ) messages received
18 if code = COMMIT (in ≥ f + 1 messages) then
19 return result
20 else :
21 return ⊥
Fig. 2. Client Code
The description so far assumes no client failures. If clients can fail, some
transactions in the pending set might never be assigned timestamps, and the
servers will be stuck, unable to determine when all potentially conflicting trans-
actions with timestamp t have been received. We resolve this situation by falling
back to a binary consensus algorithm, over the values COMMIT and CANCEL,
to resolve the fates of orphaned transactions. Each client tries to commit its own
transaction using the consensus algorithm, and servers try to cancel pending
transactions that are slow to receive their timestamps. We can use any ”off-
the-shelf” consensus algorithm that is guaranteed to terminate if the system
is eventually synchronous, including known algorithms that terminate in one
round if the system is well-behaved [35]. Transaction execution proceeds as fol-
lows. Once all conflicting transactions in the pending set of some transaction T
with timestamp t are either cancelled or their timestamp is known, the position
of T in the order will be known and the execution can then proceed as outlined
above for all transactions that have not been cancelled.
The protocol guarantees safety at all times and liveness under eventual syn-
chrony [11]. The rest of this section describes the client and server code in de-
tails. In this description we assume that clients can fail by crashing but are not
Byzantine. We address Byzantine clients in Section 6.
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state = initialState
clock = 0
proposed[*][*] = ∅ // servers 7→ timestamp 7→ Set transaction
pending[*] = ∅ // timestamp 7→ Set transaction
confirmed[*] = ∅ // timestamp 7→ Set transaction
committed = ∅ // timestamp 7→ Set transaction
cancelled = ∅ // Set transaction
resolving = ∅ // Set transaction
log = [] // Sequence transaction
timer [∗] = ∞ // timestamp 7→ real time timer
time : real time clock value at a server
Fig. 3. Server State with Initializations
4.1 Client Code
The client code (Figure 2) proceeds in two stages. In the first stage (Lines 5–
11), the client sends a Propose message to all servers, and collects at least n −
f ProposeAck responses. Each response contains an integer timestamp that is
the local clock value at the server when the server received the client request.
The client calculates tˆ which is equal to 1 plus the (f + 1)st largest among the
timestamps it received and assigns it to its transaction. It is important to note
that this particular way of choosing timestamps is what guarantees timestamps
to be non-skipping. In the second stage (Line 14–21), the client broadcasts a
Confirm message with tˆ,and waits to receive f +1 identical ResolveAck responses
to determine the transaction’s outcome. A ResolveAck message has three fields:
(1) the transaction, (2) a code, either COMMIT or CANCEL, and (3) a result. If
the return code is COMMIT, the call was successful, and the result is returned,
otherwise a failure indication is returned. If the return code is CANCEL, the call
was unsuccessful. perhaps because the client was delayed in the middle of the
protocol. If a failure indication ⊥ is returned, the client is free to attempt the
call again.
4.2 Server Code
Server State The server state (Figure 3 ) is composed of the following fields.
– state is the ledger state. A transaction is applied to state when it commits.
– clock is an integer counter that tracks the latest timestamp assigned to a
transaction. We assume this counter does not overflow. Since timestamps are
non-skipping, a 128-bit counter should be more than sufficient in practice.
– proposed keeps track of transactions that have been proposed at various
servers and the local clocks at those servers when the proposed message was
received. When a transaction is added to proposed[s][k], where s is a server
and k is a clock value, the timestamp of the transaction might not be known.
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– pending is a map from timestamps to sets of transactions. For timestamp t,
pending[t] is the set of transactions that might be assigned timestamp t or
earlier.
– confirmed is a map from timestamps to sets of transactions. For timestamp
t, confirmed[t] is the set of known transactions that will either commit with
timestamp t or will be cancelled.
– committed is set of transactions known to have committed.
– cancelled is the set of transactions known to be cancelled.
– log is the sequence of committed transactions as they are applied to the
ledger.
– timer is an array of timers used to timeout pending transactions.
– time is a local time at the server to measure real time for timeouts. The local
time of servers are independent and need not be synchronized.
Server Actions The server continually receives messages (Figure 4). In the
pseudocode we denote the sender of a message received by a server with c if the
sender is a client and with s if the sender is a server.
When the server receives a Propose(T) (Lines 2–5) message from client c, it
adds (T,clock) to proposed[ self ], where self denotes the server executing the
code and clock is the local clock value when the proposed message is received.
The server returns the current clock value to the client and forwards the proposed
message together with the clock value at which it was received to all other servers.
When a server receives a forwarded Propose message from server s, it adds the
message to the set proposed[s] of proposed messages that server s is aware of.
These sets of messages will be used in calculating the sets of pending transactions
for any timestamp value.
When a server receives a Confirm(T,tˆ) (Line 10) message from a client or a
server, the server advances clock to the maximum of tˆ and its current value,
and adds the transaction to the set of confirmed transactions for timestamp tˆ
and forwards the Confirm message to the other servers. If the received Confirm
message is from a server s, s is added to a set ConfirmWitness[T], which is the
set of servers that has received the Confirm message for transaction T. If the
set of witnesses is large enough, and the set pending[tˆ] is not yet calculated, the
server calculates the set pending[tˆ] by taking the union of all propose messages
that servers in the set of witnesses were aware of before receiving the Confirm
message for T . We will show that this pending set is guaranteed to contain
all transactions that can be confirmed with timestamp tˆ or less. Finally, if the
transaction T for which the Confirm message is received is not in the process
of being resolved (not resolving), the server also launches a consensus protocol
with the other servers to try to to COMMIT T. The consensus protocol is run
in a ResolveThread forked by the server (Figure 5).
The only remaining point that can obstruct T’s execution are pending trans-
actions. These are transactions that might be confirmed with timestamps less
than or equal to the timestamp of T and, if they conflict with T, will be applied
to the log before T. The server sets a timer to give each pending transaction time
10 R.A. Bazzi and M. Herlihy
1 repeat
2 if Propose(T) received from c:
3 proposed[ self ] = proposed[ self ] ∪ {(T,clock)}
4 send Proposed(T, clock) to all servers
5 send ProposeAck(T, clock) to c
6
7 if Proposed(T,clock) received from s:
8 proposed[s ] = proposed[s] ∪ {(T,clock)}
9
10 if Confirm(T, tˆ) received from c or s :
11 clock = max(clock, tˆ)
12 confirmed[ tˆ] = confirmed[tˆ] ∪ {T}
13 send Confirm(T, tˆ) to all servers if not previously sent
14 ConfirmWitness[T] = [T] ∪ {s}
15 if pending[tˆ] = ∅ ∧ |ConfirmWitness[T]| = n− f :
16 pending[tˆ] =
⋃
s∈ConfirmWitness[T]{T’: ∃ k ≤ tˆ, (T,k) ∈ proposed[s ]}
17 timer [ tˆ] = time+δ
18 if T 6∈ resolving :
19 resolving = resolving ∪ {T}
20 fork ResolveThread(T, tˆ, COMMIT) // try to commit this transaction
21
22
23 if StartResolution (T, tˆ, code) received from s: // join another consensus
24 if T 6∈ resolving : // code is either COMMIT or CANCEL
25 if code = COMMIT:
26 resolving = resolving ∪ {T}
27 fork ResolveThread(T, tˆ, COMMIT);
28 else if code = CANCEL:
29 CancelWitness[T] = CancelWitness[T] ∪ {s}
30 if |CancelWitness[T]| ≥ f + 1 : // correct server wants to cancel
31 resolving = resolving ∪ {T}
32 fork ResolveThread(T, ⊥, CANCEL);
33
34
35 if timer [t] expired for some t: // if timer expired , try to cancel
36 for each txn in pending[t ]: // slow transactions
37 if txn 6∈ resolving :
38 resolving = resolving ∪ {txn}
39 fork ResolveThread(txn, ⊥ , CANCEL)
40
41 ApplyResolvedTransaction() // attempt to apply transactions
42 until false
Fig. 4. Server Code
to be confirmed. If the timer expires and a transaction in the pending set is not
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1 ResolveThread(T, t, code)
2 send StartResolution (T, t , code) to all servers
3 if code = COMMIT then
4 initialValue = 1
5 else
6 initialValue = 0
7
8 // run consensus protocol for transaction T
9 // with initial value = initialValue
10
11 if decision = 1 then
12 add T to committed
13 else
14 add T to cancelled
Fig. 5. Resolve Thread
1 OrderBefore(T,T’) =
2 T ∈ confirmed[t] ∧
3 ((T’ ∈ confirmed[t′ ] ∧ t < t′) ∨ (T’ ∈ confirmed[t] ∧ T < T ′)
4
5 ApplyResolvedTransaction()
6 if ∃ T ∈ committed ∩ confirmed[t] ∧ pending[t] 6= ∅ : ∀T’ ∈ pending[t ]:
7 ¬ conflict (T,T’) ∨ T’ ∈ cancelled ∨ T’ ∈ log ∨ OrderBefore(T,T’)
8 log .append(T)
9 state , result = apply(T, state ))
10 send ResolveAck(T,COMMIT,result) to T sender
11 if ∃ T: T ∈ cancelled ∧ T 6∈ log
12 log .append(T)
13 send ResolveAck(T,CANCEL,⊥) to T sender
Fig. 6. Applying Resolved Transactions
confirmed, the transaction is considered obstructing, and a starting a consensus
protocol is launched to try to CANCEL the the transaction. In practice, timer
delay can be adjusted dynamically to match the current level of synchrony [20].
We discuss the timer requirements later in the correctness proofs.
The ResolveThread (Figure 5) encapsulates the consensus protocol executed
by the servers. The first message sent by ResolveThread is a StartResolution (T,code)
message (Line 2 of ResolveThread) which lets a server that has not heard directly
from a client join the consensus protocol for a given transaction (Lines 23–32 of
the server code). After sending the StartResolution message, the ResolveThread
starts a binary consensus protocol for the transaction with initial value 1 for
COMMIT and initial value 0 for CANCEL. The ResolveThread adds T to the
set committed if the decision of the consensus protocol is 1 and adds T to the
set cancelled if the decision of the consensus protocol is 0.
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When a server receives a StartResolution (T,code), its behavior depends on
whether code is COMMIT or CANCEL. A server immediately joins an attempt to
commit a transaction, but joins an attempt to cancel a transaction if it receives
f +1 distinct StartResolution (T,CANCEL) messages for transaction T , ensuring
that at least one correct server timed out that transaction.
Finally, a server attempts to apply transactions (Figure 6) to the replica
state. It is essential that conflicting transactions are executed in the same order
by all servers. We use the OrderBefore() predicate which to determine the order
of confirmed transactions (whose timestamps are known). Servers order con-
firmed transactions first by timestamp, and then by hashing their transaction
identifiers, yielding a deterministic order on transactions, called the canonical
order (Figure 6, Line 3). If any transaction is not confirmed, the OrderBefore()
predicate evaluates to false.
A transaction can be applied once is committed and confirmed for timestamp
t, the set of pending transactions for t is known, and if every other transaction
T’ in the pending set is either non-conflicting, cancelled, or already applied to
the log.
Note that it is possible that pending transactions might appear in groups with
different timestamps at different correct servers, but if they become committed,
they will have the same timestamp at all correct servers, and if they are cancelled,
they will be cancelled by all correct servers.
5 Proofs of Correctness
In this section we prove that the solution correctly implements a distributed
ledger by showing that client transactions receive the same responses from all
correct replicas, and that in periods of synchrony the non-faulty clients’ trans-
actions are eventually applied.
We start by restating the model assumptions. Messages are delivered in the
order sent: if a correct server s1 receives a forwarded Confirm message from
another correct server s2, then s1 must have received all previously forwarded
Proposemessages from s2. In periods of synchrony, the binary consensus protocol
is guaranteed to terminate. All correct servers invoke ResolveThread), and either
they all add the transaction to the committed set, or they all add the transaction
to the cancelled set. Finally, client messages forwarded by servers are signed by
the clients and cannot be forged. (We omit message validation from our code for
simplicity.)
5.1 Supporting Lemmas
Lemma 1 (Same confirmed timestamp). If a transaction is confirmed with
timestamps t and t′ at two correct servers, then t = t′.
Proof. A transaction is added to a the confirmed set if a Confirm(T,tˆ) is received
from a client directly or indirectly forwarded by a server (Figure 4 Line 10).
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Since messages by the client are assumed to be signed by the client and clients
are assumed to be non-Byzantine, a server cannot forge a confirm message and
the confirm message sent by the client to different servers will have the same
timestamp.
The previous lemma allows us to define what it means for a transaction to
be assigned a timestamp value.
Definition 1 (Assigned timestamp). We say that a transaction T is as-
signed timestamp t if some correct server received a Confirm(T, tˆ) message from
a client.
Lemma 2 (Non-Skipping timestamps). If a transaction is assigned times-
tamp t, then for every t′, 0 < t′ < t, some transaction is assigned timestamp
t′.
Proof. We show that for any t0, the first timestamp larger than t0 assigned to
a transaction is t0 + 1. Consider the first transaction T
′ for which a timestamp
t′ > t0 is assigned. The client must have received replies greater than or equal
t′ − 1 from f + 1 servers one of which must be correct.
Consider the correct server that returned a timestamp t′′ ≥ t′ − 1 ≥ t0. The
timestamp t′′ must have been assigned to an earlier transaction because the clock
can only advance at a correct server after a timestamp is assigned (Line 11). This
means that t′′ cannot be greater than t′ − 1 for otherwise an earlier transaction
is assigned timestamp larger than t0. But t
′− 1 ≥ t0, which gives us t
′′ ≤ t0. So,
we have established that t0 ≤ t
′ − 1 ≤ t′′ and t′′ ≤ t0, which means that t
′′ = t0
and t′ = t0 + 1.
The next two lemmas establish that if T1 does not see T2, then T2 must
have a larger timestamp and executing T1 can be done without establishing
the resolution status of T2. We start with a definition of what it means for a
transaction to see another.
Definition 2 (Transaction seeing another). We say a transaction T1 sees
that is assigned timestamp t1 sees transaction T2 if T2 is added to the pending[t1]
set of some correct server.
Lemma 3 (Non-concurrent transactions get different timestamps). If
T1 does not see T2 and t1 is assigned a timestamp, then T2 is assigned a later
timestamp.
Proof. Suppose T1 and T2 are assigned timestamps tˆ1 and tˆ2 respectively. When
a correct server receives T1’s Confirm message, its clock value will be at least tˆ1
(Line 11). Since T1 is assigned a timestamp, its Confirm message is received by
some correct server, and eventually all correct server will receive T1’s Confirm
message. It follows that that there will be enough witnesses to T1’s Confirm
message and pending[t1] will be calculated by every correct server (Line 16),
When pending[t1] is calculated, a set of n − f servers, which we will call S1,
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has confirmed the receipt of T1’s Confirm message with timestamp tˆ1. Because
T1 did not see T2 , T2’s Propose message could not have preceded T1’s Confirm
message at any correct sever in S1.
Let S2 be the set of servers that acknowledge T2’s Propose messages. Every
correct server in S2, added T2 to the proposed set and returned its local clock
value to the client (Line 8). Because S1 and S2 both have size at least n − f ,
their intersection includes at least f +1 correct servers. At each of these servers,
T2’s Propose message arrived after T1’s Confirm message, so T2 received at least
f + 1 ProposeAck messages with timestamp values greater than or equal to tˆ1,
so T2 will choose tˆ2 greater than tˆ1.
It follows that, for a given transaction T with timestamp tˆ, the set pending[t]
at a correct server contains only transactions that can be assigned timestamp tˆ or
less because any transaction not in the set will be assigned a timestamp larger
than t. But we need to be sure that if pending[t] at a given correct server is
not empty, then it will contain all transaction that could ever be in confirmed[t′],
t′ ≤ t. This would allow the server to detect when all conflicting transactions with
timestamp t or less have been resolved (COMMIT or CANCEL), at which time
it can execute those among them that have not been cancelled. The following
lemma establishes this fact.
Lemma 4 (pending has all the information needed to resolve transac-
tions). At all times,
⋃
t′<t
confirmed[t′] ⊆ P , where P = pending[t] is a non-
empty pending[t] set calculated by a correct server.
Proof. The lemma states that any transaction that will ever be confirmed with
timestamp less than or equal to t must be in every pending[t] set calculated by a
correct server. The proof is similar to the proof of 3. Let T be a transaction that
is assigned timestamp t and pending[t] by the pending set calculated by a correct
server on the receipt of T Confirm message when there are enough witnesses to
the Confirm message. If a transaction T’ will be assigned timestamp t′ ≤ t, then
at most f servers reply to the client’s Propose message with timestamp value
greater than t′− 1. Of the remaining n− 2f servers, at most f are faulty, which
leaves f +1 correct servers that reply to the propose message with a timestamp
less than t′. One of these f + 1 servers must forward T’s Confirm message and
must have forwarded the Propose message before that. It follows that pending[t]
must contain transaction T.
5.2 Safety
We start by showing that all correct servers execute conflicting transactions in
the same order, and that all correct servers execute the same transactions. Then
we show that the execution at each correct server is equivalent to a “canonical”
execution in which transactions (even non-conflicting ones) are executed accord-
ing to timestamp order (with ties broken canonically). This implies that correct
servers return the same result for each transaction. Then we show that the ex-
ecution is linearizable by showing that it is equivalent to an execution in which
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each transaction is executed atomically at some point between its invocation and
response.
Lemma 5 (Same order for applied conflicting transactions). If two cor-
rect servers apply two conflicting non-cancelled transactions T1 and T2 to the
log, they apply them in the same order.
Proof. If T1 and T2 are two conflicting non-cancelled transactions and T1 is
applied before T2, then OrderBefore(T1,T2) must be true, implying that that
T1’s assigned timestamp is smaller than that of T2, or that both are assigned
the same timestamp and T2 appears before T2 in the canonical order. This
property holds at every correct server, so all correct servers that apply both
transactions will apply them in the same order.
Lemma 6 (Agreement on transaction resolution). If a correct server de-
cides to commit or cancel a transaction, then every correct server eventually
makes the same decision.
Proof. The decision to commit or cancel a transaction depends on the decision
of the consensus protocol initiated in the ResolveThread (Figure!5). By the agree-
ment property of consensus, any two correct servers will have the same decision
value.
Definition 3 (Canonical execution). A canonical execution is one that con-
tains all transactions applied to the log of some correct server ordered by first by
timestamp, then by transaction hash code. Cancelled transactions with unknown
timestamp are assumed to be assigned the smallest timestamp for which they
appear in a pending set of a correct server.
Since all correct servers execute the same sequence of transactions, this definition
is independent of the particular correct server chosen.
Lemma 7 (Every execution is equivalent to the canonical execution).
The responses of transactions as applied to the log of a correct server is iden-
tical to the responses of the same transactions as they appear in the canonical
execution.
Proof. We consider an execution E of a correct server in which transactions are
applied as allowed by the protocol. We say that two transactions T1 and T2
are out-of-order if T1 appears before T2 in E but T2 appears before T1 in the
canonical execution. We prove by induction on the number of out-of-order pairs
of transactions that E is equivalent to the canonical execution. For the base case,
there are no out-of-order transactions and E is the canonical execution. For the
induction step, since E has at least one out-of-order pair of transactions, it must
have to successive transactions, say T1 and T2, that are out of order. Consider
the execution E’ which is identical to varE’ except that T2 appears before T1 in
E’. We show that E’ and E are equivalent. Also, compared to E, E’ has exactly
one less pair of transaction that are out-of-order. It follows by the induction
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hypothesis E’ is equivalent to the canonical execution, so E is also equivalent to
the canonical execution.
Since T1 and T2 are out of order in E, it follows that either both are com-
mitted and do not conflict or at least one of them is cancelled. If one of them
is cancelled, it is immediate that E’ and E are equivalent. If T1 and T2 do not
conflict, we divide E’ into three parts: (1) Eb of transactions that appear before
T1 and T2, (2) T2 followed by T1, and (3) Ea of transactions that appear after
T1 and T2. The execution of Eb is the same in E and E’, so the state of the ledger
is identical in E and E’ after executing Eb. Since T1 and T2 do not conflict, they
access and modify different parts of the state (read and write sets are disjoint),
so executing T2 followed by T1 after Eb will result in the same ledger state and
same responses as executing T1 followed by T2 Eb. Finally Ea is identical in E
and E’ and executed starting from the same ledger state, so all transactions in
Ea will return the same response.
Theorem 1 (Linearizability). The implementation is linearizable.
Proof. Since all applied transactions are committed and correct servers commit
the same set of transactions, it follows that the sets of transactions applied by
correct servers are the same. The previous lemma shows that the responses of
transactions applied by the correct servers is the same. It remains to define
an execution that is consistent with real time order and consistent with the
executions of correct servers and such that a transaction takes effect somewhere
between its invocation and response in this execution. For each transaction, we
assign the real time at which the first correct server adds the transaction to its log
and we define an execution in which transactions are ordered according to this
order and in which their responses are as they are for the executions of correct
servers. This execution is consistent with the protocol order. It follows that it
is equivalent to the canonical order and therefore equivalent to the execution of
every correct server. Finally, the assigned time for a transaction is somewhere
between its invocation and response because a response is not produced before
a correct server adds the transaction to its log.
5.3 Progress
In periods of synchrony we assume there is an upper bound d on message trans-
mission. For a correct client that sends messages to all servers, we assume that
the maximum delay in the reception of messages between servers is d. We con-
sider processing delay at correct servers to be negligible.
Lemma 8. If δ > 2d, all transactions of correct clients will be committed.
Proof. We consider a transaction T of a correct server that is initiated at real
time t1 and that is assigned timestamp tˆ. At time t1+3d every correct server will
receive a message Confirm(T,tˆ) for the transaction. The earliest time at which
T can the pending[t′] set of a correct server for some t′is t1 + d. So, the earliest
time to propose to CANCEL T being t1+d+ δ (Figure 4, Line 17). Since δ > 2d,
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a correct server will receive Confirm(T,tˆ) and adds T to resolving before time
t1 + δ and the server will propose to COMMIT the transaction at that time. So,
we have shown that no correct process will propose to CANCEL a transaction
by a correct client in periods of synchrony. It follows that the transaction will
be committed. In fact, all but the t faulty servers will propose to COMMIT the
transaction. By the validity requirement of the consensus protocol, the decision
of all correct servers should be to COMMIT.
Lemma 9 (Pending transactions are resolved). If pending[t] 6= ∅ at a cor-
rect server, all transactions in pending[t] will eventually be resolved at every
correct server.
Proof. Every transaction in pending[t] 6= ∅ will be proposed to be committed
or cancelled (Figure 4, Line 20 or 39) and every correct server will eventually
commit or cancel the transaction.
Theorem 2 (Progress in periods of synchrony). In periods of synchrony,
all transactions of correct clients are applied.
Proof. Lemma 9 shows that all transactions of correct clients will be committed
in periods of synchrony. It remains to show that transactions of correct clients
will be applied by the servers. Consider a committed transaction T of a correct
client c with timestamp tˆ. We need to show that T will be applied. At the time
a correct server receives the Confirm message for T, it will calculate the pending
set if the set if empty and the set will have to contain the transaction T. By
Lemma 9, each transaction in that set will eventually be committed or cancelled.
This means that the termination condition (Figure 6, Line 7) is guaranteed to be
satisfied for every transaction that can be applied before T. Each correct server
will then be able to apply all non-cancelled transactions in confirmed[t’] for every
t′ < t.
6 Byzantine Clients
We have assumed clients fail by crashing, To tolerate Byzantine client behav-
ior, we must perform additional validation. In particular, each client must prove
that the the timestamp in its Confirm message is correctly constructed by includ-
ing the signed timestamps Avoiding replay attacks is straightforward by having
the servers sign a cryptographic hash of the messages they send to the clients,
including transaction identifiers, which serve as nonces.
7 Performance
To evaluate performance, we adopt the definitions of gracious and uncivil exe-
cutions from Clement et al. [12].
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Definition 4 (Gracious execution [12]). An execution is gracious if and
only if (a) the execution is synchronous with some implementation-dependent
short bound on message delay and (b) all clients and servers behave correctly.
Definition 5 (Uncivil execution [12]). An execution is uncivil if and only
if (a) the execution is synchronous with some implementation-dependent short
bound on message delay, (b) up to f servers and an arbitrary number of clients
are Byzantine, and (c) all remaining clients and servers are correct.
7.1 Performance in gracious executions
Performance in the absence of contention In gracious executions, and in
the absence of contention, the protocol requires 2.5 round-trip message delay
from the time a client makes a request to the time it gets the result. It takes
one round-trip delay to receive the first response and calculate the timestamp
tˆ. It takes 1/2 round-trip delay for the servers to receive tˆ. At that time, (1)
correct servers initiate a consensus protocol to commit the transaction and (2)
forward the Confirm message to all other servers. Another 1/2 round-trip delay
later (2 round-trip delay from the start of the transaction), all correct servers
decide to COMMIT the transaction (this is possible because all correct servers
will be proposing the same COMMIT value) and calculate the pending sets. At
that point , the transaction can be executed (in the absence of contention) and
a response is received another 1/2 round-trip delay later at 2.5 round-trip delay
from the start of the transaction
Performance in the presence of contention In the presence of contention,
processing can be delayed by conflicting transactions that have the same times-
tamp. The latest a transaction started after T can be assigned the same times-
tamp as T is just short of 1.5 round-trip delay from the time T started (we
assume that previous transactions that are not concurrent with T have already
been cleared). In fact, a transaction that starts 1.5 round-trip delay after T can-
not reach the servers before the time T’s timestamp is propagated and will be
assigned a later timestamp (assuming the Propose message for the contending
transaction will propagate instantaneously in the worst case). So, in the presence
of contention, a response might not arrive before 4 round-trip delays in gracious
executions.
It is important to note that these calculations are for one individual trans-
action delay and not the system throughput under load. The throughput is not
affected by individual transaction latency. The protocol is competitive in terms
of latency with PBFT [11] which achieves 2 round-trip delay in civil executions
with a number of optimizations including speculative execution, but PBFT does
not perform well in uncivil executions.
7.2 Performance in uncivil executions
In uncivil executions, the delay depends on the level of contention. If a trans-
action is initiated and is not overlapping with any other conflicting transaction,
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its delay will be the same as in gracious executions. This is particularly good
compared to leader-based protocols in which a slow leader might need to be
timed out before processing a transaction even if it does not conflict with other
transactions.
In the presence of contention, a transaction can be delayed further. As in the
gracious execution case, we consider the latest time a transaction can be added to
the pending set of transaction T. As in the case of gracious executions, the time is
1.5 round-trip delay after T is initiated. If the client of the contending transaction
fails, the full timeout would need to be incurred and a consensus protocol would
need to be executed. So, the delay in this case would be the timeout value δ
plus the consensus time. The client will get a response by 0.5 round-trip delay
after the consensus has ended (because the other message exchanges of the client
overlap with the timeout time).
7.3 Other Performance Considerations
It is important to note that the delays are not additive. If we have transac-
tions with different timestamps, and for each timestamp there is a slow pending
transaction, no transaction incurs more than one timeout plus consensus delay
because the timers are started in a pipelined fashion. This ensures that Byblos
average throughput under client delays is minimally affected by slow clients.
Also, recall that this delay is only incurred by conflicting transactions whereas
in systems in which faulty servers are the source of the delay, all transactions
are affected by server delays.
Another potential performance improvement that we did not consider is
transaction batching [11] in which a number of transactions are processed in
batches. In our solution, servers communicate information about individual trans-
actions. On the positive side, in Byblos, in the presence of contention, more trans-
actions will get the same timestamp and the delay incurred for that timestamp
is one for all transactions. This should improve throughput.
As described, Byblos uses public-key signatures [14,31], which can add sig-
nificant overhead. Replacing signatures with message authentication codes [6]
is a subject for future work. Finally, the message complexity of our solution
is rather high: O(n) messages per transaction. Such high message complexity
is not unusual for protocols that aim to achieve bounded delay ([2,4,12,22] for
example).
8 Conclusion
We showed that non-skipping timestamps can substantially simplify state-machine
replication, facilitating a leaderless algorithm that exploits transaction semantics
to enhance concurrency. For future work, there are many ways to further im-
prove Byblos’ performance through fast-path optimizations, and through closely
integrating a consensus protocol with the state-machine replication solution.
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